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1 Introduction
In this era of globalization, it has become increasingly common for firms to outsource their
required inputs rather than produce them in-house. While many factors1 influence a firm’s
decision to outsource, it can be argued that outsourcing is primarily driven by cost consid-
erations. A firm will choose to outsource if the input supplier can offer a price that is lower
than the firm’s in-house cost. This will be the case if the supplier has a cost advantage
in one or more factors of production. Such advantages can be interpreted broadly as the
supplier having a superior production technology. For example, the supplier may be able
to hire skilled labour at a relatively low wage or it may possess advanced machineries. It
is therefore plausible that transfer of technology across firms could be a viable alternative
to outsourcing. In fact, like outsourcing, technology transfers have also grown substantially
in recent years.2 As outsourcing and technology transfer broadly serve the same purpose
of enabling one firm to use the cost-efficient production process of another firm, a natural
question is, what would make firms choose one of these contracts over another? A closely
related question is, what are the relative effects of these contracts on the consumers? This
paper seeks to address these questions in the context of imperfectly competitive markets.
There could be different possible reasons for firms to prefer outsourcing over technology
transfer. For instance, the superior technology may be labour intensive and difficult to
transfer due to imperfect mobility of labour. Additionally, transfer of technology may involve
other barriers such as intellectual property rights laws, or large initial investments that firms
may want to avoid. On the other hand, under technology transfer, a firm can produce
its inputs in-house using the superior technology which gives it complete control over its
production. Therefore a firm will prefer technology transfer over outsourcing if it wants to
maintain a higher quality standard or if it wants to avoid the risk of relying on another firm
for its inputs.
Apart from these reasons, strategic considerations play an important role in determining
the nature of input production decisions of a firm. The strategic motive will be particularly
dominant when the input-seeking firm competes with the supplier in the final good market.
This paper aims to shed light on these strategic aspects in a model of price competition.
Specifically, we consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B who are located at
the end points of the unit interval in the final good market ϕ. Consumers are uniformly
distributed in this interval and have to incur transportation costs for traveling to the end
points. Any consumer buys at most one unit of ϕ from either A or B. We consider a
production process where an intermediate good η is required to manufacture ϕ. Each firm
can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at zero cost. Both A and B can
produce η, but firm B has a lower cost due to a superior technology. Outsourcing (firm
A orders η from firm B) and technology transfer (firm B transfers its technology to firm
A) are two contracts that naturally arise in this situation. We study these contracts by
considering unit-based pricing policies for both cases, where the unit price is determined
through negotiations between firms A and B. Under an outsourcing contract, firm A can
place any order with firm B at the agreed upon price. Under a technology transfer contract,
1See, e.g., Jarillo (1993), Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997) and Domberger (1998) for a discussion of the
various diverse factors that drive outsourcing.
2For some recent empirical evidence on the growth of technology transfer across firms, see, e.g., Mendi
(2005), Nagaoka (2005) and Branstetter et al. (2006).
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firm A uses the superior technology of firm B by paying a price for each unit of production,
i.e., the technology transfer contract is based on a unit royalty.3 We denote ω to be the
effective unit cost of firm A in any contract and compare these contracts by fixing ω. We
show that these two contracts generate different strategic interaction between firms and has
important implications on prices.
Specifically we show that compared to the case of no contracts, prices never rise under
outsourcing while this is not necessarily the case under technology transfer. There are
always weakly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts that make both firms better off and no
consumers worse off. Moreover if the cost difference of firms is relatively large (i.e., firm B’s
technology is sufficiently superior), there are strictly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts
that make both firms as well as all consumers better off. On the other hand, there are
no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts: whenever both firms prefer technology
transfer over no contracts, there are always some consumers who are worse off. Finally we
show that due to the difference in strategic interaction between these two contracts, the
incentives of firms and the interest of consumers move in the opposite direction. For any ω,
whenever both firms prefer one of these two contracts, all consumers prefer the other one. It
is also shown that if the supplier firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in negotiating,
then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing.
When firm A outsources η to firm B, Hotelling meets Stackelberg. The volume of the
outsourcing order plays an interesting role of information transmission because it credibly
informs B that A is committed to maintain a specific market share in the market ϕ. This
market share can be viewed as the Stackelberg leader market share.4 When the unit price
ω is small, the Stackelberg market share is larger than A’s market share under no contracts.
This large share is sustained in equilibrium by a lower price of firm A. Given that A’s
commitment of Stackelberg market share is credible, B’s equilibrium price is also set lower
and prices of both firms fall. This results in lower profit in the market ϕ for firm B compared
to the case of no contracts. So B would accept such an outsourcing contract only if it can
obtain a large supplier profit from η to compensate for its losses in the market ϕ. This is
the case when firm B is sufficiently more efficient compared to firm A. The upshot is that
when the cost difference of two firms is sufficiently large, there are strictly Pareto improving
outsourcing contracts, i.e., both firms prefer outsourcing over no contracts and both set a
lower price for ϕ that makes all consumers better off.
Under technology transfer, firm A acquires B’s superior technology and produces η itself
using this technology. As a result, firm B knows the quantity of η produced by A only
when it receives its payments for technology transfer. As these payments are received after
profits are realized in the final good market, the informational aspect in outsourcing is
completely absent under technology transfer. Moreover since firm B’s payments from the
transfer depends on the demand of A, it has an incentive to ensure that A’s demand is not
too small. This creates a distortion that raises the effective cost of B which in turn adversely
3We consider unit pricing policies for outsourcing and unit royalty policies for technology transfer because
they are most frequently observed in practice. See Robinson and Kalakota (2004) and Vagadia (2007) for
evidence on outsourcing and Mendi (2005) and Nagaoka (2005) for technology transfer.
4When firms A and B compete in quantities as Cournot duopolists, A’s outsourcing order corresponds
to the Stackelberg leader output (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al., forthcoming). The leadership effect is
indirect under price competition: following the outsourcing order by A, equilibrium prices are formed in a
way so that A’s market share exactly equals the quantity of η it has ordered from B.
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affects prices in the market ϕ. Due to this distortion, technology transfer contracts that are
preferred by both firms necessarily make some consumers worse off. Consequently, unlike the
case of outsourcing, there are no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts in relation
to the situation of no contracts. The difference between outsourcing and technology transfer
is driven by two factors: first, the information transmission and the subsequent Stackelberg
leadership effect that leads to lower prices under outsourcing is absent under technology
transfer, and second, outsourcing orders are obtained upfront before firms set their prices,
so outsourcing has no distortive effect.
The existing literature has studied horizontal outsourcing (i.e., a firm outsources to its
rival) under different models of price competition such as a Hotelling duopoly (Shy and
Stenbacka, 2003),5 a duopoly with differentiated products (Chen et al., 2004) and a Bertrand
duopoly (Arya et al., 2007). It is concluded in these papers that horizontal outsourcing
is inefficient and leads to higher prices in the final good market. To a certain extent, we
obtain similar implications under technology transfer where we show that there are no Pareto
improving contracts. In contrast, we show that under outsourcing, prices never rise and there
are always Pareto improving contracts. Thus our result on outsourcing sharply differs with
the conclusion of the existing literature.
This difference arises because the existing literature generally treats outsourcing and
technology transfer equivalently. Specifically, it overlooks the informational aspect of out-
sourcing which is the main focus of this paper. The information transmission in outsourcing
is driven by our presumed sequence of events. In our model, firm A places its outsourcing
order of η first and then prices are set in the market ϕ. The papers mentioned before implic-
itly assume an alternative sequence where the input-seeking firm places its outsourcing order
with its rival after firms set their prices in the final good market. Under this sequence, out-
sourcing does not transmit any information to the supplier firm prior to price competition.
Since outsourcing order is not received upfront, to obtain higher profit from outsourcing
the supplier has to ensure that the input-seeking firm’s demand is not too small. As a re-
sult, the distortive effect of technology transfer is present in outsourcing which explains why
outsourcing contracts are inefficient under the sequence assumed in the existing literature.
It can be argued that our presumed sequence is more realistic. An outsourcing order
takes time to process for logistics reasons. Additionally, compared to in-house production,
an outsourcing order may have to pass through more stages of inspection. These factors
will be particularly dominant if the supplier is a foreign firm, which has been a frequently
observed occurrence in recent years. Therefore, if a firm places its outsourcing order after
receiving its demand, it may not be able to meet its demand on time. For this reason it
is natural to assume that firms negotiate and sign an outsourcing contract well in advance
before the final goods market meets. Our approach is also consistent with the literature of
outsourcing under quantity competition. In these models, the input-seeking firm chooses
its outsourcing order first and then firms choose quantities in the final good market. The
Stackelberg leadership effect is direct under quantity competition: by placing an outsourcing
order with a rival firm in a Cournot duopoly, the input-seeking firm can establish itself as the
Stackelberg leader (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al., forthcoming). The leadership effect
is indirect in our model where firms compete in prices in the final goods market. Following
5The primary focus of Shy and Stenbacka (2003) is vertical outsourcing (i.e. firms outsource to an outside
supplier), although they consider horizontal outsourcing as well.
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the outsourcing order by firm A, equilibrium prices are formed in a way so that A’s market
share exactly equals the quantity of intermediate good it has ordered from B. By showing
the presence of the leadership effect under price competition, this paper bridges the gap in
the existing literature between the outsourcing models of quantity and price competitions.
This paper is also related to the literature of capacity commitments in duopolies. When
firm A places an outsourcing order with firm B, the volume of the order can be viewed as a
capacity that A builds prior to price competition. If the demand of A in the market ϕ does
not exceed its capacity, it can meet its demand at zero marginal cost. However, if the demand
exceeds the capacity, A meets the additional demand by producing η in-house that raises its
marginal cost. We show that in equilibrium, firm A’s demand exactly equals its capacity.
This implies that A does not produce η in-house and there is no unutilized capacity. Thus,
an outsourcing contract in our paper is a natural quantity precommitment in the spirit of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). They have shown that if firms in a Bertrand duopoly can
make such commitments by building prior capacities, then prices rise to the Cournot level.
This paper presents an interesting contrast by showing that when the precommitment is
made by an input-seeking firm through an outsourcing order, prices either fall or stay the
same.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Three contrac-
tual settings—no contracts, outsourcing and technology transfer, are studied in Section 3.
Comparison of outsourcing and technology transfer contracts is carried out in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
The final good market: The market for the final good ϕ is a linear city Hotelling duopoly
with two firms A and B. Firm A is located at point 0 and firm B at point 1 of the unit
interval [0, 1]. Firms compete in prices.
Consumers are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Any consumer buys either one unit of good
ϕ, or buys nothing. Consumers receive utility V > 0 from good ϕ and utility 0 from not
buying.
The unit cost of transportation is τ > 0. For a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1], the
transportation cost to travel to firm A is τx, while the cost to travel to firm B is τ(1− x).
A consumer who buys one unit of good ϕ from either A or B gets utility V, pays the price
and incurs the cost of transportation.
Let pA, pB ≥ 0 be the prices set by firms A,B and denote p ≡ (pA, pB). Given any p, let
upx(i) be the net utility of the consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] from purchasing good ϕ from
firm i, so that
upx(i) =
{
V − pA − τx if i = A
V − pB − τ(1− x) if i = B (1)
We assume that V is a sufficiently large positive number, i.e., consumers receive a large utility
from purchasing good ϕ, so that not buying the good is never an optimal choice. Under this
assumption, any consumer buys the good from either firm A or firm B and consequently the
market ϕ is covered. A consumer at location x determines her optimal purchasing choice by
comparing upx(A) and u
p
x(B) from (1).
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Demand of firms: Let DA(p) and DB(p) be the demand received by firms A, B when
they set prices pA, pB. It follows from (1) that u
p
x(A) T upx(B)⇔ x S x˜(p) where
x˜(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ (2)
So a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] buys from A if x ≤ x˜(p) and from B if x > x˜(p).
Observe that if pA ≥ pB + τ, then x˜(p) ≤ 0 and all consumers buy from B. On the other
hand, if pB ≥ pA + τ, then x˜(p) ≥ 1 and all consumers buy from A. If pA < pB + τ and
pB < pA + τ , then 0 < x˜(p) < 1. In that case, consumers at location x ∈ [0, x˜(p)] buy from
A and x ∈ (x˜(p), 1] from B. Hence we conclude that
(DA(p), DB(p)) =

(0, 1) if pA ≥ pB + τ
(1, 0) if pB ≥ pA + τ
(x˜(p), 1− x˜(p)) if pA < pB + τ and pB < pA + τ
(3)
The intermediate good: An intermediate good η is required to produce ϕ. Both firms
can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at the same constant marginal cost,
which we normalize to zero.
The constant marginal cost of production of good η is c > 0 for A and c > 0 for B. Firm
B has a superior technology for producing η, so its cost is lower, i.e., c < c. We also assume
that the costs are sufficiently small. Specifically, it is assumed that
0 < c < c < τ (4)
The effective unit cost of η for a firm will depend on the nature of contracts that A and B
have in the intermediate good market. We consider the following possibilities:
(i) No contract between A and B;
(ii) Outsourcing contract between A and B: A orders η from B;
(iii) Technology transfer from B to A: firm B transfers its superior technology of producing
η to firm A.
Before formally describing the three contractual situations above, it will be useful for our
analysis to introduce the Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB).
The Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB): This is the standard Hotelling duopoly game
played between firms A and B in the final good market ϕ, where the constant unit cost of
producing the intermediate good η is cA ≥ 0 for firm A and cB ≥ 0 for firm B and each
firm can transform one unit of η to one unit of ϕ at zero cost. This game has the following
stages.
Stage 1: Firms A and B simultaneously set prices pA, pB ≥ 0. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), firm i
receives the demand Di(p), which is given by (3).
Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ.
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The demand fulfilling constraints are qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p). If the cost of producing
η is positive for firm i, optimality requires that it produces qi = Di(p) units of η and
transforms these Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand. If the cost is zero, it is
optimal for i to produce any qi ≥ Di(p) units of η and transform Di(p) units to good ϕ to
fulfill its demand. In either case, the payoff (profit) functions of A and B in H(cA, cB) are
ΦA(p) = (pA − cA)DA(p) and ΦB(p) = (pB − cB)DB(p).
Lemma 1 characterizes Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of H(cA, cB).
Lemma 1 Let cA, cB < τ. The game H(cA, cB) has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let
pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) be the SPNE price, market share and profit of firm i:
(i) pA = τ + (2cA + cB)/3, pB = τ + (cA + 2cB)/3.
(ii) DA = 1/2− (cA − cB)/6τ, DB = 1−DA = 1/2 + (cA − cB)/6τ.
(iii) ΦA = (3τ − cA + cB)2/18τ, ΦB = (3τ + cA − cB)2/18τ.
Proof See the Appendix.
3 Three contractual settings
3.1 No contracts between A and B
When there are no contracts between firms A and B in the intermediate good market η, the
unit cost of producing η is c for firm A and c for firm B. Accordingly, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played between A and B in the market ϕ. Denote
θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3
Proposition 1 When there are no contracts between firms A and B, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played. This game has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let p0i , D0i and Φ0i be
the SPNE price, demand and profit of firm i. Then
(i) p0A = τ + θ, p
0
B = τ + θ.
(ii) D0A = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ, D0B = 1−D0A = 1/2 + (c− c)/6τ ;
(iii) Φ0A = (3τ − c+ c)2/18τ, Φ0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ.
Proof Follows from Lemma 1 by taking cA = c and cB = c.
3.2 Outsourcing contract between A and B
When there is an outsourcing contract between A and B, firm A has two options of acquiring
the intermediate good η: (i) it can order η from firm B or (ii) it can produce it in-house at
unit cost c. We do not impose any exclusivity restriction on outsourcing contracts. That is,
firm A can order η from firm B as well as produce it in-house. Firm B produces its required
η entirely by itself at unit cost c.
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We consider linear unit pricing contracts: firm B charges a constant price for each unit
of η that it supplies to firm A. The unit price is determined through negotiations between
firms A and B. Under outsourcing contracts, the strategic interaction between A and B is
described as follows.
Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate6 on the unit price ω at
which B can supply η to A. As firm A can produce η itself at unit cost c, an outsourcing
contract can lower its cost of production only if ω < c. Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c, it
obtains a positive profit as a supplier only if ω > c. For this reason, we restrict ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
the game ΓS(ω) is played between A and B.
The game ΓS(ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
Stage I: Firm A chooses the amount K ∈ [0, 1] of η to order7 from firm B. Firm A receives
K units of η by paying ωK to firm B and B obtains the supplier profit (ω − c)K.
Stage II: Firms A,B play the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c) that has the following
stages.
Stage 1: Firms A,B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market ϕ.
For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3).
Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A,B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
As A already has K units of η from stage 1, its demand fulfilling constraint is
K + qA ≥ DA(p) (5)
As firm B produces η entirely by itself, the corresponding constraint for B is
qB ≥ DB(p) (6)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized and the game terminates.
Since the unit cost of producing η is positive for each firm, by (6), optimality requires that
firm B produces qB = DB(p) units of η and transforms DB(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its
demand.
By (5), if DA(p) ≤ K (firm A’s demand does not exceed the amount of η it has ordered
from B), then it is optimal for A to choose qA = 0, (i.e., it does not produce η in-house) and
6Instead of explicitly modeling the bargaining process through which A and B determine ω, we completely
characterize the outcomes for all possible values of ω. The solution of a particular bargaining process with
specific bargaining powers of A and B can be immediately obtained from our conclusions. See Section 4.2.
7Since the maximum demand that a firm can have is 1, there is no loss of generality in restricting K ≤ 1. In
our model firms A and B negotiate on the price ω and then A chooses the outsourcing order K. Alternatively,
one can allow A and B to negotiate on both ω and K. Our qualitative conclusions remain unaltered under
this alternative.
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transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. If DA(p) > K, it is optimal to choose qA = DA(p) − K
(i.e., firm A produces exactly the additional amount of η that it needs to meet its demand)
and transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. Therefore, qA = max{0, DA(p)−K}.
Payoffs of firms in ΓS(ω): We can write the payoffs of firms by using the optimal
values of qA, qB. Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost
of producing qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from supplying K units of η
to A at price ω. Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qB = DB(p), its payoff is
ΠωB(K, p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)K = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)K (7)
Firm A’s payoff also has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qA units of η in-house to fulfill its demand and (iii) its payment to firm B for acquiring K
units of η at price ω. Since firm A’s unit cost of η is c and qA = max{0, DA(p) − K}, its
payoff is
ΠωA(K, p) = pADA(p)− cqA−ωK =
{
pADA(p)− ωK if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K)− ωK if DA(p) > K (8)
We determine SPNE of ΓS(ω) by backward induction. So we begin from stage II.
3.2.1 Stage II of ΓS(ω): The Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c)
The game HK(c, c) can be viewed as a Hotelling duopoly game in which firm A has built a
“capacity” of K prior to the game.8 Specifically, in this game:
(i) Firm B has constant unit cost c.
(ii) Firm A has capacity K which is commonly known between A and B. If the demand
received by A does not exceed K, it can fulfill the demand at zero unit cost. However,
if its demand exceeds K, A has to incur the cost c for every additional unit.
Observe from (8) that for firm A, ωK is the cost of capacity K that it pays upfront to firm
B before stage II, so ωK plays no role from stage II onwards. From (8), firm A’s profit in
HK(c, c) is
ΦKA (p) =
{
pADA(p) if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K) = (pA − c)DA(p) + cK if DA(p) > K (9)
Therefore, firm A has unit cost zero if DA(p) ≤ K, while its effective unit cost is c > 0 if
DA(p) > K. It follows from (7) that (ω−c)K is the profit that firm B obtains upfront before
stage II and it plays no role thereafter. Ignoring these terms, from (7), firm B’s profit in
HK(c, c) is
ΦKB (p) = (pB − c)DB(p) (10)
Lemma 2 characterizes SPNE of the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c). Recall that for
i ∈ {A,B}, pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) denote the SPNE price, market share and
profit of firm i in the standard Hotelling game H(cA, cB).
Lemma 2 HK(c, c) has a unique SPNE that has the following properties.
8When K = 0, HK(c, c) becomes the standard Hotelling duopoly game H(c, c).
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(i) If K < DA(c, c), the prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE of
H(c, c). The profits are ΦKA = ΦA(c, c) + cK and ΦKB = ΦB(c, c). Firm A fully utilizes
its capacity K and in addition produces DA(c, c) −K units of η in-house to fulfill its
demand.
(ii) If K > DA(0, c), the prices, market shares and profits of firms are the same as in the
SPNE of H(0, c). Firm A does not utilize K − DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does
not produce η in-house.
(iii) If K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)], the prices of firms A, B are
pKA = 3τ + c− 4τK and pKB = 2τ + c− 2τK (11)
The market share of firm A is K and that of firm B is 1 − K. Firm A fully utilizes
its capacity K and does not produce η in-house. The profits are ΦKA = p
K
AK and Φ
K
B =(
pKB − c
)
(1−K).
Proof See the Appendix.
Observe that in the game HK(c, c), firm B’s unit cost is always c. For firm A, the
minimum possible unit cost is 0 while the maximum possible unit cost is c. Therefore, in an
SPNE of HK(c, c) the maximum market share that firm A can have is DA(0, c) (its SPNE
market share in the standard Hotelling game H(0, c)), while the minimum market share that
it can have is DA(c, c) (the corresponding market share in H(c, c)).
Lemma 2 shows that if the capacity of firm A is too small [K < DA(c, c)], building such
a capacity gives A no strategic advantage in HK(c, c) and the game yields the same SPNE
outcome as H(c, c). On the other hand, if the capacity is too large [K > DA(0, c)], the game
results in the same SPNE outcome as H(0, c) where part of the capacity remains unutilized
(given positive cost of capacity, it is clear that building such large capacity cannot be optimal
for firm A). Intermediate capacities [DA(c, c) ≤ K ≤ DA(0, c)] have a commitment value in
that for these values of K, the SPNE prices are such that the market share of A in HK(c, c)
exactly equals K. As a result, the capacity is fully utilized and A does not produce η in-
house. Such intermediate capacities have the effect of establishing firm A as the Stackelberg
leader in the final good market.
Figure 1 illustrates this Stackelberg effect. It identifies the SPNE (pKA , p
K
B ) of HK(c, c)
for different values of K. Since firm B’s unit cost is always c, its best response is the same
as in a standard Hotelling game, given by the line B1B2. Firm A’s unit cost depends on its
demand and its best response is a piecewise linear function that has three segments. If B’s
price pB is relatively small, A’s best response is the same as in the standard Hotelling game
H(0, c), given by A1A2. On the other hand, if pB is relatively large, A’s best response is the
same as in H(c, c), given by A3A4. For intermediate values of pB, its best response A2A3 is
such that the demand it receives is exactly equal to its capacity K.
Figure 1(a) corresponds to the case K < DA(c, c). For this case, B1B2 intersects the
best response of A at the segment A3A4. The SPNE is the same as in H(c, c). Figure 1(b)
corresponds to the case K > DA(0, c) where B1B2 intersects the best response of A at the
segment A1A2 and the SPNE is the same as in H(0, c). Figure 1(c) corresponds to K ∈
[DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]. For this case B1B2 intersects the best response of A at the intermediate
segment A2A3. The SPNE (p
K
A , p
K
B ) is such that firm A’s market share exactly equals its
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capacity K, effectively establishing firm A as the Stackelberg leader in the Hotelling duopoly.
This is where Hotelling meets Stackelberg.
3.2.2 Stage I of ΓS(ω)
Now we move back to stage I of ΓS(ω) where firm A chooses its outsourcing order K ∈ [0, 1]
of η. For any such K, the game HK(c, c) is played in stage II whose unique SPNE is given
in Lemma 2. Let ΦKA be the SPNE profit of firm A in HK(c, c). In any SPNE play of ΓS(ω),
when firm A orders K units of η from firm B in stage I, its payoff is ΦKA − ωK (its SPNE
profit in HK(c, c) net of its payment ωK that it makes to firm B). By Lemma 2, the payoff
of A is
ΠωA(K) =

ΦA(c, c) + cK − ωK if K < DA(c, c)
pKAK − ωK if K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]
ΦA(0, c)− ωK if K > DA(0, c)
(12)
The payoff of firm B is its SPNE profit in HK(c, c) plus its input supplier profit (ω − c)K.
By Lemma 2, this payoff is
ΠωB(K) =

ΦB(c, c) + (ω − c)K if K < DA(c)(
pKB − c
)
(1−K) + (ω − c)K if K ∈ [DA(c), DA(0)]
ΦB(0, c) + (ω − c)K if K > DA(0)
(13)
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To determine SPNE of ΓS(ω), in stage I, we solve the single-person decision problem of firm A
which is to choose K ∈ [0, 1] to maximize ΠωA(K) given by (12). Proposition 2 characterizes
SPNE of any outsourcing game ΓS(ω).
Proposition 2 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓS(ω) has a unique SPNE. Let K(ω) be the amount of
η that firm A orders from firm B and for i ∈ {A,B}, let pSi (ω), DSi (ω) and ΠSi (ω) be the
price, market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE. The SPNE has the following general
properties.
(i) DSA = K(ω), i.e., the demand that firm A receives in the market ϕ exactly equals the
quantity of η that it orders from firm B. Consequently firm A fully utilizes the amount
of η that it orders from B and does not produce η in-house.
(ii) ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and Π
S
B(ω) is increasing in ω. Moreover Π
S
A(ω) > Φ
0
A, i.e., compared
to no contracts, firm A is better off.
(iii) Compared to no contracts, no consumer is worse off.
The SPNE has the following specific properties.
(I) Let c− c > (3/4)τ. There is ĉ ∈ (c, c) such that
(a) If ω ∈ (c, ĉ), then K(ω) = 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ ∈ (DA(c, c), DA(0, c)) . The market
share of firm A is K(ω) and that of firm B is 1−K(ω). The prices are
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 < p
0
A and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4 < p
0
B
Consequently all consumers are better off compared to no contracts. The payoffs
are
ΠSA(ω) = p
S
A(ω)K(ω)−ωK(ω) and ΠSB(ω) =
(
pSA(ω)− c
)
(1−K(ω))+(ω − c)K(ω)
There is c˜ ∈ (c, ĉ) such that ΠSB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T c˜, i.e., compared to no contracts,
firm B is better off only if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ).
(b) If ω ∈ [ĉ, c), then K(ω) = DA(c, c) = D0A. The prices and market shares of firms
are exactly the same as in the case of no contracts. The payoffs are
ΠSA(ω) = Φ
0
A + (c− ω)D0A and ΠSB(ω) = Φ0B + (ω − c)D0A
Compared to no contracts, both firms are better off and consumers are neither
better off nor worse off.
(c) An outsourcing contract is strictly Pareto improving (both firms and all consumers
are better off) if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ) and weakly Pareto improving (both firms are better off
and no consumer is worse off) if ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(II) Let c− c ≤ (3/4)τ. Then for any ω ∈ (c, c), K(ω) = DA(c, c) and the conclusion is the
same as in (I)(b). Consequently an outsourcing contract is weakly Pareto improving
for all ω ∈ (c, c).
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Proof See the Appendix.
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, recall that firm A’s outsourcing order of η is equiv-
alent to a capacity built by A prior to price competition. The volume of the order transmits
the information to B that A commits to maintain a specific share in the market ϕ which
indirectly establishes firm A as the Stackelberg leader in the market ϕ. The supplier price ω
is the unit cost of building the capacity for firm A. When ω is relatively large, the Stackel-
berg leader market share coincides with A’s market share under no contracts. For this case
firm A does not utilize its Stackelberg leader advantage since capacity building is relatively
costly (Prop 2(I)(b)). On the other hand, when ω is relatively small, the Stackelberg leader
market share is larger than A’s market share under no contracts. In such a case, capacity
building is relatively less expensive which enables firm A to utilize its leadership advantage
(Prop 2(I)(a)). The Stackelberg leader market share is sustained in equilibrium by a lower
price of firm A. Given that A’s commitment to maintain this share is credible, equilibrium
reasoning implies that B’s equilibrium price is also set lower, so that prices of both firms
fall. This results in lower profit for firm B in the market ϕ compared to the situation of
no contracts. This will be acceptable to B only if it can recover its losses in the final good
market ϕ from its supplier profit in the market η, which could be the case only when B is
significantly more efficient compared to A in the production of η. Consequently, if the cost
difference of two firms is sufficiently large [specifically, c − c > (3/4)τ ], there are strictly
Pareto improving outsourcing contracts: consumers are better off since prices of both firms
fall, firm A is better off due to its Stackelberg leadership advantage and firm B is also better
off since its supplier profit from market η more than offsets its losses from market ϕ.
3.3 Technology transfer contract between A and B
When firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A, both A and B can produce the
intermediate good η at lower cost c. As in the case of outsourcing contract, we consider linear
unit pricing contracts. The unit pricing contract for technology transfer is the unit royalty
contract where the rate of royalty is denoted by r. The strategic interaction between A and
B under technology transfer is described as follows.
Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate on the unit royalty r.
Under the unit royalty contract, firm A uses the superior technology of firm B. In return, A
pays B the royalty r for each unit of η that it produces using the superior technology. So,
firm A’s effective unit cost of η is c + r. As A can produce η itself at unit cost c, a royalty
contract can lower its cost of production only if c+ r < c or r < c− c. On the other hand,
firm B can obtain a positive revenue from technology transfer only if r > 0. So we restrict
r ∈ (0, c− c).
To compare royalty contracts with outsourcing contracts, it will be convenient to denote
ω ≡ c + r. Then ω represents the effective unit cost of η for firm A under the superior
technology, while r = ω − c represents the unit profit of firm B from technology transfer.
Since r ∈ (0, c− c), we have ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
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firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A and the game ΓT (ω) is played firms
between A and B.
Remark 1 Observe that the interpretation of ω is the same as in outsourcing contracts.
For firm A, ω is the unit cost of obtaining η from firm B. For firm B, (ω − c) is the unit
profit from supplying η to A. The difference between outsourcing and technology transfer
is that under outsourcing, A chooses the quantity of η and places its order with B before
firms set their prices for the final good market ϕ. Firm B produces η using its superior
technology and supplies η to A at price ω. In contrast, under technology transfer, A uses
the superior technology to produce η itself after prices are set and its demand is known.
This difference, which is generally overlooked in the existing literature, alters the strategic
interaction and affects the prices of the final good ϕ.
The game ΓT (ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
Stage I: Firms A and B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market
ϕ. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3).
Stage II: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
The demand fulfilling constraints for firms A, B are
qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p) (14)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized, firm A makes its royalty payments to
firm B and the game terminates.
If firm A produces η using its pre-contract inferior technology, its unit cost is c. If it produces
η using the superior technology, its unit cost is ω < c. So it is optimal for firm A to produce
η entirely using the superior technology. Firm B’s unit cost of producing η is c > 0. Since
both ω and c are positive, by (14), optimality requires that for i ∈ {A,B}, firm i produces
qi = Di(p) units of η and transforms Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand.
Payoffs of firms in ΓT (ω): Using optimal values of qA, qB, we can write the payoff of
each firm. Firm A’s payoff has two components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) total effective
cost of producing qA units of η to fulfill its demand. Observe that this total effective cost is
(c + r)qA = ωqA, so it includes firm A’s royalty payments to firm B. As qA = DA(p), the
payoff of firm A is
ΠωA(p) = pADA(p)− ωqA = (pA − ω)DA(p) (15)
Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from technology transfer rqA = (ω − c)qA.
Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qi = Di(p), its payoff is
ΠωB(p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)qA = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)DA(p)
From (3), DA(p) +DB(p) = 1. Using this in the expression above, the payoff of firm B is
ΠωB(p) = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)(1−DB(p)) = (pB − ω)DB(p) + (ω − c) (16)
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Since (ω − c) is a constant, from (16) it follows that, firm B in effect solves the problem
of a firm that has unit cost ω. By (15), firm A has unit cost ω. Therefore, firms A and
B effectively play the Hotelling duopoly game H(ω, ω) and SPNE of ΓT (ω) coincides with
SPNE of H(ω, ω) with the only modification that firm B’s payoff has an additional constant
(ω − c).
Proposition 3 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓT (ω) has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let pTi (ω),
DTi (ω) and Π
T
i (ω) be the price, market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE Γ
T (ω). The
SPNE has the following properties.
(I) The prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE of H(ω, ω). Each
firm sets the same price τ + ω and obtains the same market share 1/2. The payoffs
are ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 and Π
T
B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c), i.e., ΠTA(ω) is a constant and ΠTB(ω) is
increasing in ω.
(II) ΠTA(ω) > Φ
0
A, i.e., compared to no contracts, firm A is better off.
(III) There are constants c < θ < θ̂ < θ < c such that
(a) Compared to no contracts, all consumers are better off if ω ∈ (c, θ) and all con-
sumers are worse off if ω ∈ (θ, c). If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that
consumers at location x ∈ [0, λ] are better off and x ∈ (λ, 1] are worse off.
(b) ΠTB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂, i.e., compared to no contracts firm B is better off only if
ω ∈ (θ̂, c).
(c) Whenever both firms prefer technology transfer over no contracts [i.e., if ω ∈ (θ̂, c)],
there are always some consumers who prefer no contracts over technology transfer.
Consequently, there is no technology transfer contract that is Pareto improving
(i.e., making both firms as well as all consumers better off).
Proof See the Appendix.
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, first observe that in contrast to the case of out-
sourcing, firm B does not receive its revenue from technology transfer upfront. It is received
after the price competition stage in the form of royalty payments. To obtain relatively large
royalty payments from technology transfer, B has an incentive to ensure that A’s share in
the market ϕ is not too small. This has a distortive effect which causes B’s effective unit
cost to rise to ω > c [see (16)]. As A’s unit cost falls to ω < c, firm A has an efficiency gain
while B has an efficiency loss. The resulting effect on consumers depends on which one of
these opposing factors dominates. When ω is sufficiently small (ω < θ), the efficiency gain of
A dominates, prices of both firms fall and all consumers are better off. When ω is sufficiently
large (ω > θ), the efficiency loss of B dominates, prices of both firms rise and all consumers
are worse off. For intermediate values of ω (ω ∈ [θ, θ]), the effect on consumers is ambiguous
and it depends on their location. Consumers who are close to A (x < λ) benefit from the
efficiency gain of A and therefore are better off. In contrast, consumers who are close to B
(x ≥ λ) are adversely affected by the efficiency loss of B and are worse off (Prop 3(III)(a)).
Observe that all consumers are better off under technology transfer compared to no
contract only if ω is sufficiently small (ω < θ). However, when ω is small, B obtains a lower
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revenue from royalty. For this reason, firm B prefers technology transfer over no contract
only if ω is relatively large, in which case there are always some consumers who are worse off.
This explains why there is no Pareto improving technology transfer contract (Prop 3(III)(c)).
4 Outsourcing versus technology transfer
Having characterized the outcomes of outsourcing and technology transfer games, in this
section we compare these two contracts from the points of view of the two firms as well as
the consumers.
4.1 Comparison of contracts with same ω
Recall that under both outsourcing and technology transfer, ω is firm A’s effective unit
cost of obtaining η and (ω − c) is firm B’s unit profit from the market η. Proposition 4
compares these two contracts by keeping ω fixed across contracts, so that the effects of
cost efficiency (for firm A) and supplier profits (for firm B) are the same across contracts.
Therefore this proposition identifies the differences between these two contracts that are
purely driven by the salient strategic aspects of these contracts: the Stackelberg leadership
effect for outsourcing and the distortive effect for technology transfer.
Proposition 4 Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants α, β, θ, θ ∈ (c, c), satisfying α < θ < β < θ
such that the following hold.
(I) If ω ∈ (c, α), both firms prefer outsourcing and if ω ∈ (β, c), both firms prefer technol-
ogy transfer. If ω ∈ [α, β], then firm A prefers technology transfer while firm B prefers
outsourcing.
(II) If ω ∈ (c, θ), all consumers prefer technology transfer and if ω ∈ (θ, c), all consumers
prefer outsourcing. If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers at location
x ∈ [0, λ] prefer technology transfer while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1] prefer outsourcing.
(III) Whenever both firms prefer a specific contract, all consumers prefer the other contract.
Specifically if ω ∈ (c, α), both firms prefer outsourcing and all consumers prefer tech-
nology transfer. If ω ∈ (β, c), both firms prefer technology transfer and all consumers
prefer outsourcing.
Proof See the Appendix.
Firm A’s payoff under technology transfer is a constant τ/2, while its payoff under out-
sourcing is decreasing in ω. Accordingly, A prefers outsourcing for relatively small values
of ω and technology transfer for relatively large values of ω. Firm B’s payoff has two com-
ponents: profit from the final good market ϕ and profit from the intermediate good market
η. We have seen that under technology transfer, there is a distortive effect that raises the
effective cost of B. As a result, the profit of B in ϕ is lower under technology transfer
than outsourcing. Therefore, if B is solely interested in the profits from the market ϕ, it
would prefer outsourcing. On the other hand, if B is only interested in the profits from the
market η, it would prefer technology transfer since its supplier profit from η increases with
the market share of A, which is higher under technology transfer. Consequently the two
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components of B’s payoff conflict with each other. This trade-off is settled by the magnitude
of ω. When ω is relatively small, the profit from η does not contribute significantly to B’s
payoff. As a result, the effect of the market ϕ dominates and B prefers outsourcing. On
the other hand, when ω is relatively large, the profit from η contributes significantly to B’s
payoff, so it prefers technology transfer.
For relatively large values of ω, prices under outsourcing are the same as in the case of no
contracts, but prices under technology transfer exceed the no contract levels. Accordingly,
all consumers prefer outsourcing for relatively large values of ω. On the other hand, for
relatively small values of ω, prices under outsourcing may fall, but prices under technology
transfer fall significantly below the no contract levels. Consequently all consumers prefer
technology transfer for relatively small values of ω. For intermediate values of ω, the price of
firm A falls while the price of B rises under technology transfer. As a result, the preference
of consumers depends on their location as in Proposition 3.
Finally it is shown in Proposition 4 that the interest of consumers and incentives of firms
conflict each other. Whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers
prefer the other one.
4.2 Comparison of contracts under bargaining
We have characterized the outcomes of outsourcing and technology transfer contracts gen-
erally for all ω ∈ (c, c) without explicitly specifying the bargaining schemes or the relative
bargaining powers of the negotiating firms A and B. However, our results can be directly
applied to any specific bargaining scheme as follows.
1. Outsourcing: For ΓS(ω), it follows from Proposition 2 that there is c˜ ∈ [c, c) such that
for any ω ∈ (c˜, c), both firms A and B are better off compared to the situation of no
contracts. Since ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and Π
S
B(ω) is increasing in ω, if the bargaining
power of firm B is relatively large, ω would be close to c, whereas if firm A has a
relatively large bargaining power, ω would be close to c˜.
2. Technology transfer: For ΓT (ω), by Proposition 3, there is θ̂ ∈ (c, c) such that for any
ω ∈ (θ̂, c), both firms A and B are better off compared to the situation of no contracts.
Since ΠTA(ω) is a constant and Π
T
B(ω) is increasing in ω, for this case, the solution of
standard bargaining schemes (e.g., the Nash bargaining) would be ω = c.
In Proposition 4, we have compared the two contracts by keeping ω fixed across contracts.
One important conclusion of this comparison is that the interest of consumers and incentives
of firms conflict each other. Whenever both firms prefer a specific contract, all consumers
prefer the other one. A natural question is if this conclusion is robust to particular bargaining
schemes, because the solution of a particular bargaining scheme with given bargaining powers
may not result in the same value of ω under outsourcing and technology transfer. Proposition
5 addresses this question for situations where the bargaining power of firm B (the supplier
firm) is relatively large, which is usually the case assumed in the existing literature.
For clarity of presentation, we assume that under each of these contracts—outsourcing
and technology transfer—the unit price ω is determined by the Nash bargaining solution
with specific bargaining powers of the negotiating firms A,B. Denote the bargaining power
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of firm B by γ ∈ (0, 1), so that the bargaining power of firm A is 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1). Let ωS(γ)
and ωT (γ) be the respective Nash bargaining solutions under outsourcing and technology
transfer.
Proposition 5
(I) There is c∗ ∈ (c, c) such that for ω ∈ (c∗, c), pSi (ω) = p0i < pTi (ω) < pTi (c).
(II) ∃ γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following hold whenever firm B has bargaining power
γ ∈ (γ∗, 1).
(a) ωT (γ) = c and ωS(γ) ∈ (c∗, c).
(b) ΠSA(ω
S(γ)) < ΠTA(ω
T (γ)) = τ/2 and ΠSB(ω
S(γ)) < ΠTB(ω
T (γ)) = τ/2 + c− c, i.e.,
both firms prefer technology transfer to outsourcing.
(c) For i ∈ {A,B}, pSi (ωS(γ)) = p0i < pTi (ωT (γ)) = pTi (c), i.e., all consumers prefer
outsourcing to technology transfer.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that the result that the interest of consumers and incentives of firms
conflict with each other is robust to the introduction of specific bargaining processes. In
particular, if the supplier firm has relatively large or full bargaining power over the input-
seeking firm under both outsourcing and technology transfer contracts, then both firms would
prefer technology transfer. In such a case, technology transfer results in higher prices which
is detrimental for consumers.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has compared two contracts that are frequently observed in industry practices:
outsourcing and technology transfer. Departing from the existing literature, we have shown
that these two contracts generate different strategic interactions that alter incentives of
firms and have important effects on prices. Identifying the Stackelberg leadership effect in a
Hotelling duopoly model, we have shown that there are always Pareto improving outsourcing
contracts that make both firms and all consumers better off. In contrast, there are no
Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Due to the difference in strategic interaction
between these contracts, the interest of consumers and incentives of firms move in completely
opposite directions. When firms prefer outsourcing, all consumers prefer technology transfer
and when firms prefer technology transfer, all consumers prefer outsourcing.
Appendix
We begin with Lemma A1 which will be used to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma A1 Let cA, cB < τ. Let i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j. In the game H(cA, cB):
(i) The best response of firm i to firm j’s price pj is
bci(pj) =
{
(pj + τ + ci)/2 if pj ≤ 3τ + ci
pj − τ if pj > 3τ + ci (17)
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(ii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of H(cA, cB), then pi ≤ 3τ + cj for i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j.
Proof (i) By (3), if pi ≤ pj − τ , then Di = 1 and i’s payoff is pi − ci, which is strictly
increasing in pi. If pi ≥ pj + τ, then Di = 0 and i’s payoff is zero. Therefore, to determine
best response of i, it is sufficient to consider pi ∈ [pj − τ, pj + τ ]. In that case, by (2) and
(3), Di = (pj − pi + τ)/2τ and i’s payoff is Φi = (pi − ci)(pj − pi + τ)/2τ. Since ci < τ, we
have pj + τ > ci. Hence the unconstrained maximum of Φi with respect to pi is attained at
b(pj) = (pj + τ + ci)/2 < pj + τ. The result in (17) follows by noting that b(pj) ≥ pj − τ iff
pj ≤ 3τ + cj.
(ii) Suppose (pA, pB) is an SPNE and pj > 3τ + ci. Then by (17), pi = bci(pj) = pj− τ. In
that case, Dj = 0 and firm j obtains zero payoff. Let j deviate to set the price p
′
j = pi = pj−τ .
Following this deviation, by (2) and (3), firm j will receive demand 1/2 and payoff (pj−cj)/2.
Since pj > 3τ + cj > cj, firm j’s post-deviation payoff is positive. This shows that firm j has
improved its payoff following the deviation, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1 By Lemma A1(ii), to find SPNE of H(cA, cB), it is sufficient to consider
pi ≤ 3τ+ci for i ∈ {A,B}. Then by (17), the best response of A is to set pA = (pB+τ+cA)/2
and the best response of B is to set pB = (pA + τ + cB)/2. The system of best response
equations has a unique solution where pA = τ + (2cA + cB)/3 and pB = τ + (cA + 2cB)/3.
This proves (i). Parts (ii)-(iii) follow directly from (i).
Lemma A2 will be used to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma A2 Denote p ≡ (pA, pB), g(pB) := pB + τ − 2τK, p(K) := 4τK − τ and p(K) :=
4τK − τ + c. In the game HK(c, c):
(i) DA(p) S K ⇔ pA T g(pB).
(ii) The profit of firm A is
ΦKA (p) =

pA − c+ cK if pA < pB − τ
(pA − c)(pB − pA + τ)/2τ + cK if pB − τ ≤ pA < g(pB)
pA(pB − pA + τ)/2τ if g(pB) ≤ pA ≤ pB + τ
0 if pA > pB + τ
(18)
(iii) The best response of A to B’s price pB is
bKA (pB) =

b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 if pB < p
g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p
bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 if p < pB ≤ 3τ + c
bc(pB) = pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(19)
(iv) Consider the demand that firm A receives when it sets price pA = b
K
A (pB). This demand
is less than K if pB < p, more than K if pB > p and exactly equals K if p ≤ pB ≤ p.
(v) The profit of firm B is
ΦKB (p) =

pA − c if pB < pA − τ
(pB − c)(pA − pB + τ)/2τ if pA − τ ≤ pB ≤ pA + τ
0 if pB > pA + τ
(20)
(vi) The best response of B to A’s price pA is
bKB (pA) = bc(pA) =
{
(pA + τ + c)/2 if pA ≤ 3τ + c
pA − τ if pB > 3τ + c (21)
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(vii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of H(cA, cB), then pA ≤ 3τ + c and pB ≤ 3τ + c.
Proof (i) Observe that since K ∈ [0, 1], we have pB − τ ≤ g(pB) ≤ pB + τ. It follows from
(3) that if pA ≤ pB − τ, then DA(p) = 1 ≥ K and if pA ≥ pB + τ, then DA(p) = 0 ≤ K. Now
consider pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ]. Then from (2) and (3), we have DA(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ S
K ⇔ pA T g(pB). This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Observe from (9) that ΦKA (p) = (pA−c)DA(p)+cK if DA(p) ≥ K. The first expression
of (18) follows by noting that DA(p) = 1 ≥ K for pA < pB − τ. Since DA(p) = (pB − pA +
τ)/2τ ≥ K for pA ∈ [pB − τ, g(pB)] (by part (i)), the second expression follows.
Again from (9), ΦKA (p) = pAD
p
A if DA(p) ≤ K. Since DA(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ ≤ K for
pA ∈ [g(pB), pB + τ ] (by part (i)), the third expression of (18) follows. The last expression
follows by noting that DA(p) = 0 ≤ K for pA > pB + τ.
(iii) It follows from (18) that ΦKA (p) is strictly increasing for pA ≤ pB − τ and it equals
zero for pA ≥ pB + τ. Therefore, to determine best response of A, it is sufficient to consider
pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ].
Let E1 = [pB − τ, g(pB)] and E2 = [g(pB), pB + τ ]. Observe from (18) that for pA ∈ E1,
firm A’s effective unit cost is c and its problem is the same as in the standard Hotelling game
H(c, cB). Taking i = A and cA = c in (17) of Lemma A1, the unconstrained maximum of
ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E1 is attained at pA = bc(pB). Note from (17) that if pB > 3τ + c, then
bc(pB) = pB − τ. If pB ≤ 3τ + c, then bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 S g(pB) ⇔ pB T p where
p := 4τK − τ + c ≤ 3τ + c. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E1
ΦKA (p) =

g(pB) if pB < p
(pB + τ + c)/2 if p ≤ pB ≤ 3τ + c
pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(22)
Observe from (18) that for pA ∈ E2, firm A’s effective unit cost is 0 and its problem is the
same as in the standard Hotelling game H(0, cB). Taking i = A and cA = 0 in (17) of Lemma
A1, the unconstrained maximum of ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E2 is attained at pA = b0(pB). Note
from (17) that if pB > 3τ, then b0(pB) = pB − τ ≤ g(pB), so the maximum is attained at
pA = g(pB). If pB ≤ 3τ, then b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 T g(pB)⇔ pB S p where p := 4τK − τ ≤
3τ. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E2
ΦKA (p) =
{
(pB + τ)/2 if pB ≤ p
g(pB) if pB > p
(23)
As g(pB) ∈ E1 ∩E2, choosing pA = g(pB) is feasible for both E1 and E2. Using this fact, the
result in (19) follows from (22)-(23).
(iv) It follows from (iii) that bKA (pB) > g(pB) if pB < p, b
K
A (pB) < g(pB) if pB > p and
bKA (pB) = g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p. Using this fact, the result follows from (i).
(v)-(vi) Noting that firm B’s constant unit cost of η is c, (20) follows from (2) and (3),
and (21) follows from (17) by taking i = B and cB = c.
(vii) Follows from (19) and (21) by the same reasoning as the proof of Lemma A1(ii).
Proof of Lemma 2 Using Lemma A2(vii), to find SPNE of HK(c, c), consider pA ≤ 3τ + c
and pB ≤ 3τ + c. From (19), firm A’s best response bKA (pB) is piecewise linear with three
segments: bc(pB) (if pB > p), b0(pB) (if pB < p) and g(pB) (if pB ∈ [p, p]). From (21), firm B’s
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best response is linear, given by bc(pB). Hence any segment of b
K
A (pB) can intersect bc(pB)
at most once. It will be useful to recall that for i = 1, 2, the SPNE price and market share
of firm i in H(cA, cB) are denoted by pi(cA, cB) and Di(cA, cB).
Note that bc(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(c, c). Firm
B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of the system
(pA = bc(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(c, c) and pB = pB(c, c). We note that pB(c, c) T p⇔
K S DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB > p iff pB = pB(c, c) > p, which holds
iff K < DA(c, c) (see Figure 1(a)). For this case, firm A fully utilizes its capacity K and
moreover produces DA(c, c)−K units of η in-house to meet its demand.
Next observe that b0(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(0, c).
Firm B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of
the system (pA = b0(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(0, c) and pB = pB(0, c). We note that
pB(0, c) S p ⇔ K T DA(0, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB < p iff pB = pB(0, c) < p,
which holds iff K > DA(0, c) (see Figure 1(b)). For this case, firm A does not utilize
K −DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does not produce η in-house.
Finally observe that the unique solution of (pA = g(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = 3τ + c−
4τK and pB = 2τ + c−2τK. Note that 2τ + c−2τ T p⇔ K S DA(0, c) and 2τ + c−2τK S
p⇔ K T DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB ∈ [p, p] iff pB = 2τ + c− 2τK ∈ [p, p],
which holds iff K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] (see Figure 1(c)). For this case, firm A’s SPNE
market share exactly equals its capacity K. It fully utilizes its capacity and does not produce
η in-house.
The results (i)-(iii) of Lemma 2 follow from the conclusions of the last three paragraphs.
Proof of Proposition 2 We prove the specific properties (I)-(II) of Proposition 2. The
general properties will follow directly from the specific properties.
(I) Here we solve the problem of firm A in Stage 1 where A chooses K ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
ΠωA(K) given in (12). As in the last case, Π
ω
A(K) is strictly increasing for K ≤ DA(c, c) and
strictly decreasing for K ≥ DA(0, c). So it is sufficient to consider K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)].
Then by (11) and (12),
ΠωA(K) = p
K
AK − ωK = (3τ + c− ω − 4τK)K.
Since τ > c > ω, we have 3τ + c − ω > 0. Hence the unconstrained maximum of ΠωA(K)
is attained at Θ(ω) := 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ < DA(0, c) = 1/2 + c/6τ. Therefore, over K ∈
[DA(c, c), DA(0, c)], the maximizer of Π
ω
A(K) is
K(ω) = min{Θ(ω), DA(c, c)} (24)
Comparing Θ(ω) with DA(c, c) = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ , we have
Θ(ω) T DA(c, c)⇔ ω S ĉ where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ (25)
Observe that (i) c− ĉ = τ + c/3− c/3 > 0 and (ii) ĉ− c = (4/3) [c− c− (3/4)τ ] . Hence
ĉ T c⇔ c− c T (3/4)τ (26)
From (24), (25) and (26), we conclude that
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(1) If c− c ≤ (3/4)τ, then K(ω) = DA(c, c) for all ω ∈ (c, c).
(2) If c − c > (3/4)τ, then (i) K(ω) = Θ(ω) for ω ∈ (c, ĉ) and (ii) K(ω) = DA(c, c) for
ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
The results of (II)(b) and (III) of Prop 2 follow from (1) and (2)(ii) above.
To prove (II)(a) of Prop 2, observe from (2)(i) above that if c−c > (3/4)τ and ω ∈ (c, ĉ),
then K(ω) = Θ(ω) ∈ (DA(c, c), DA(0, c)) where Θ(ω) = 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ. From Lemma
2(iii), it follows that the market share of firm A is Θ(ω), while the share of B is 1 − Θ(ω).
Taking K = Θ(ω) in (11), it follows that
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4.
Note from Prop 1(II) that under no contracts, the prices are
p0A = τ + θ and p
0
B = τ + θ where θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3.
As ω < ĉ, we have p0A − pSA(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/2 > 0 and p0B − pSB(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/4 > 0. Hence all
consumers are better off.
The payoffs of the firms are obtained from (12) and (13) by using the values of pSA, p
S
B
and taking K = Θ(ω). Note from (12) that since ω < c, firm A can be better off compared
to the case of no contracts by simply choosing K = DA(c, c). Therefore, under its optimal
choice K(ω), it must be better off. The payoff of B is
ΠSB(ω) = (5τ + ω − c)2/32τ + (ω − c)(3τ + c− ω)/8τ (27)
which is strictly increasing in ω. Recall from Prop 1 that under no contracts, B obtains
Π0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ. Hence ΠSB(ω)−Π0B is strictly increasing in ω. Note that since τ > c
and c− c > (3/4)τ , we have
ΠSB(c)− Π0B = (27τ − 4c+ 4c)[(3/4)τ − c+ c]/72τ < 0 and
ΠSB(ĉ)− Π0B = 2(3τ − c+ c)[c− c− (3/4)τ ]/9τ > 0.
Hence ∃ c˜ ∈ (0, ĉ) such that ΠSB(ω) T Π0B ⇔ ω T c˜. This completes the proof of II(a). Part
(II)(c) follows from (II)(a) and (b).
Proof of Proposition 3 (I) From (15) and (16) it follows that SPNE prices and market
shares of ΓT (ω) coincide with SPNE of game H(ω, ω). Taking cA = ω and cB = ω in Lemma
1, the prices and market shares are obtained. Using the SPNE prices and market shares, the
payoffs are obtained from (15) and (16).
(II) Follows directly from part (I) and Proposition 1(iii).
(III)(a) Recall from Prop 1 that when there are no contracts, the SPNE prices are p0A =
τ + θ and p0B = τ + θ where c < θ < θ < c with
θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3 (28)
The SPNE prices in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ + ω. Therefore, if ω ∈ (c, θ), then
pTi (ω) < p
0
i for i ∈ {A,B} and all consumers prefer technology transfer over no contracts. If
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ω ∈ (θ, c), pTi (ω) > p0i for i ∈ {A,B} and all consumers prefer no contracts over technology
transfer.
If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then pTA(ω) ≤ p0A and pTB(ω) ≥ p0B. Note that in ΓT (ω), firm A’s SPNE
market share is 1/2 > D0A where D
0
A = DA(c, c) is the SPNE market share of firm A under
no contracts. Consider the consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A]. In both cases (i.e., no contracts and
ΓT (ω)), they buy from firm A. As pTA(ω) ≤ p0A, these consumers are better off in ΓT (ω). Next
consider the consumers at x ∈ [1/2, 1]. In both cases they buy from firm B. As pTB(ω) ≥ p0B,
they are worse off in ΓT (ω). Finally consider any consumer at x ∈ [D0A, 1/2). When there is
no contract, such a consumer buys from firm B to obtain the net utility
U0x = V − p0B − τ(1− x) = V − (τ + θ)− τ(1− x)
In ΓT (ω), this consumer buys from A to obtain the net utility
UTx = V − pSA − τx = V − (τ + ω)− τx
Hence UTx −U0x T 0⇔ x S λ(ω) := 1/2−(ω−θ)/2τ. Since ω ≥ θ, we have λ(ω) ≤ 1/2. Since
D0A = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ, from (28) we have λ(ω)−D0A = (θ− ω)/2τ ≥ 0 (since ω ≤ θ). Thus
λ(ω) ∈ [D0A, 1/2]. We conclude that consumers at x ∈ [D0A, λ] prefer technology transfer
while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1/2) prefer no contracts. Since consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A) prefer
technology transfer and x ∈ [1/2, 1] prefer no contracts, the proof of (III)(a) is complete.
(III)(b) Note that ΠT (ω) = τ/2 + (ω− c) and Φ0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ. Denoting f(ω) :=
ΠT (ω)− Φ0B, note that f(ω) is increasing, f(c) = −(c− c)(6τ + c− c)/18τ < 0 and f(c) =
(c− c)(12τ − c + c)/18τ > 0. Hence ∃ θ̂ ∈ (c, c) such that ΠT (ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂. Standard
computations show that θ̂ ≡ θ + (c − c)2/18τ. Therefore, θ̂ > θ. Comparing θ̂ with θ from
(28), we have θ − θ̂ = (c− c)(6τ + c− c)/18τ > 0 proving that θ < θ̂ < θ.
(III)(c) Follows from parts (a) and (b).
Lemma A3 will be used to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma A3 Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such that
(I) ΠTA(ω) T ΠSA(ω)⇔ ω T α.
(II) ΠTB(ω) T ΠSB(ω)⇔ ω T β.
Proof Denote σ := c − c and observe that σ < τ. Also for i ∈ {A,B} we denote ∆i(ω) :=
ΠTi (ω)−ΠSi (ω). We prove the lemma by showing that there are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such
that (I) ∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α and (II) ∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
(I) Recall that ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 for all ω ∈ (c, c) (Prop 3) and ΠSA(ω) is strictly decreasing
in ω (Prop 2). Hence ∆A(ω) is strictly increasing in ω. To determine Π
S
A(ω), we consider
the following possible cases where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, from Prop 2, we have
ΠSA(ω) = (p
S
A − ω)K(ω) = (3τ + c− ω)2/16τ, so that ∆A(ω) = τ/2− (3τ + c− ω)2/16τ
Observe that ∆A(c) = −τ/16 < 0 and ∆A(ĉ) = [2σ2 − (3τ − 2σ)2]/18τ. Hence ∆A(ĉ) T 0⇔
σ T 3(2−√2)τ/2. We have the following two possibilities.
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(i) If 3(2 − √2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Since ∆A(c) < 0, ∃ α̂ ∈ (c, ĉ) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α̂. Standard computations show that
α̂ ≡ (3− 2
√
2)τ + c (29)
(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Hence ∆A(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): For this case K(ω) = DA(c, c) and ΠSA(ω) = Φ0A + (c − ω)D0A =
(3τ − σ)2/18τ + (c− ω)(3τ − σ)/6τ. Hence we have
∆A(ω) = τ/2− (3τ − σ)2/18τ − (c− ω)(3τ − σ)/6τ
Note that ∆A(c) = σ(6τ − σ)/18τ > 0. Noting that ∆A(ω) is continuous, from the last case
we know that ∆A(ĉ) T 0⇔ σ T 3(2−
√
2)τ/2. Again we consider two possibilities.
(i) If 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Hence ∆A(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Since ∆A(c) > 0, ∃ α˜ ∈ (ĉ, c) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜. Standard computations show that
α˜ ≡ 2cτ/(3τ − σ)− σ(c+ c)/3(3τ − σ) + c/3. (30)
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 2, ΠSA(ω) and ∆A(ω) are the same as in Subcase
1(b) for all ω ∈ (c, c). From Subcase 1(b), ∆A(c) > 0. Noting that ∆A(c) = −σ(3τ−σ)/18τ <
0, we conclude that ∃ α˜ ∈ (c, c) [given in (30)] such that ∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜.
Define
α :=
{
α̂ if 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ
α˜ if σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2 (31)
Using (31), for 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, the result follows from Subcases [1(a)(i)]-[1(b)(i)], for
(3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, it follows from Subcases [1(a)(ii)]-[1(b)(ii)] and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ,
from Case 2.
(II) Recall from Prop 3 that ΠTB(ω) = τ/2+(ω−c) for all ω ∈ (c, c). To determine ΠSB(ω),
we consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, by Prop 2 and (27), we have
ΠSB(ω) = (5τ − c+ ω)2/32τ + (ω − c)[3/8− (ω − c)/8τ ] and
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)[5/8 + (ω − c)/8τ ]− (5τ − c+ ω)2/32τ
Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. Now observe that ∆B(ĉ) = [(τ + 2σ)
2 − 13τ 2]/24τ <
(9τ 2 − 13τ 2)/24τ < 0 (since σ < τ). Hence ∆B(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): For this case, by Prop 2, we have ΠSB(ω) = Φ0B + (ω − c)D0B =
(3τ + σ)2/18τ + (ω − c)(3τ + σ)/6τ, so that
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)(1/2 + σ/6τ)− (3τ + σ)2/18τ
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Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. We know from the last case that ∆B(ĉ) < 0. Observing
that ∆B(c) = σ(3τ + 2σ)/18τ > 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (ĉ, c) such that ∆B(ω) T 0 ⇔
ω T β. Standard computations show that
β ≡ 2cτ/(3τ + σ) + σ(c+ c)/3(3τ + σ) + c/3 (32)
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 2, ΠSB(ω) and ∆B(ω) are the same as in
Subcase 1(b) for all ω ∈ (c, c). From Subcase 1(b), we know that ∆B(c) > 0. Noting that
∆B(c) = −σ(6τ + σ)/18τ < 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (c, c) [given in (32)] such that
∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
The result for σ > (3/4)τ follows from Subcases 1(a)-(b) and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ, it follows
from Case 2.
Proof of Proposition 4 (I) We prove (I) from Lemma A3 by showing that α < β. Denote
σ := c− c. First let σ > 3(2−√2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ. Then by Case 1 of the proof Lemma A3(II),
β > ĉ and by subcases [1(a)(ii)]-[1(b)(ii)] and (31) of the proof of Lemma A3(I), α = α̂ < ĉ.
Hence β > α. Next consider σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2. Then by (31), α = α˜. By (30) and (32) we
have β − α˜ = σ(9τ 2 + σ2)/3(9τ 2 − σ2) > 0.
(II) To prove (II), we consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, from Prop 2, the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4.
From Prop 3, the SPNE prices in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ +ω. Hence p
S
A(ω)−pTA(ω) =
(τ + c − ω)/2 > 0 and pSB(ω) − pTB(ω) = (τ + 3c − 3ω)/4 T 0 ⇔ ω S τ/3 + c. Note from
(25) that ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ. Hence (τ/3 + c)− ĉ = (4/3)(τ + c− c) > 0. Therefore, for all
ω ∈ (c, ĉ), we have ω < (τ/3 + c) and hence that pSB(ω) > pTB(ω). Consequently for this case
all consumers prefer technology transfer over outsourcing.
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): Note from Prop 2 that for this case the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are
the same as in the case of no contracts. Therefore, comparing outsourcing and technology
transfer for consumers is the same as comparing technology transfer with no contracts and
we can use the results of Prop 3 (III)(a).
Since θ = (2c + c)/3 and ĉ = 4c/3 − c/3 − τ, we have θ − ĉ = τ + c − c > 0, i.e.,
θ > ĉ. From Prop 2(III)(a), it then follows that (i) if ω ∈ [ĉ, θ), then all consumers prefer
technology transfer over outsourcing, (ii) if ω ∈ (θ, c), then all consumers prefer outsourcing
over technology transfer and (iii) if ω ∈ [θ, θ], there is λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers
at x ∈ [0, λ] prefer technology transfer and x ∈ (λ, 1] prefer outsourcing. Combining the
conclusions of Subcases 1(a)-(b), the proof for the case of σ > (3/4)τ is complete.
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, for all ω ∈ (c, c), the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are the
same as in the case when there are no contracts. The result then follows directly from Prop
3(III)(a).
(III) The result will follow from (I)-(II) if we can show that α < θ < β < θ. Note from
(31) that if σ > 3(2 − √2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ, then α = α̂ < ĉ. Since θ > ĉ, for this case, we
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have θ > α. Next consider σ ≤ 3(2 − √2)τ/2. Then by (31), α = α˜. By (30) we have
θ− α˜ = σ2/3(3τ − σ) > 0. From (32) and (28), it follows that θ− β = σ2/3(3τ + σ) > 0 and
β − θ = τσ/(3τ + σ) > 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
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